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Recording the Vietnam War:
Photographic Coverage in Newsmagazines from 1963 to 1974.
(Tet Offensive, Vietnam war, War Photographs)
Written, verbal and visual accounts of man's destructive 
measures on one another do not seem to detour the violence of war. 
Yet it is the visual images of a war that have best brought home 
the reality of war to the American public. This thesis focused on 
the Vietnam war, the first war where motion and still photography 
played a decisive part in the outcome of the war.
The purpose of this thesis was to determine if the image of 
war changed before and after the Tet Offensive in Vietnam during 
the time period of August, 1964, to August, 1973. Photographs of 
the war taken in Vietnam and published in Life. Newsweek, and Time, 
the leading newsmagazines during this time period, were reviewed. 
The scenes and primary subjects pictured, how the primary subject 
was portrayed and the perspective presented were analyzed for 
apparent shifts in coverage. The Tet Offensive was chosen as the 
mid-point since it marked the fundamental turning point in the war.
During the decade of Vietnam coverage reviewed, the 
newsmagazines shifted their focus of coverage in three areas. One 
shift was in the scenes captured in the Vietnam images. Prior to 
Tet, the American public was throw right into battle with the 
soldiers. Actual combat scenes were the norm. After Tet, scenes 
shifted towards more combat related and non-combat related 
photographs such as soldier camaraderie and visiting politicians.
A second shift occurred in the subject matter of the
photographs published. The American soldier was highlighted prior 
to Tet, showing numerous scenes of American boys rescuing fellow 
soldiers, troops storming up hills and general triumphant battle 
scenes.
The newsmagazines also concentrated on who our soldiers were 
fighting for, the South Vietnamese. Photographers captured moments 
of mothers cradling their blood drenched children and the 
destruction left from a bombing raid. Yet after Tet, these scenes 
fading away. In their place came scenes of the Allied soldier 
fighting the war which doubled in number after Tet. As photographs 
of American soldiers decreased a parallel increase in those 
picturing Allied soldiers occurred.
The final photographic shift noted was in the portrayal of the 
primary subject. A shift away from life threatening scenes was 
apparent after Tet. The public viewed a much more sanitized 
version of the war. Fewer dead or wounded individuals were 
portrayed after Tet, no matter what degree of danger was apparent 
in the scene.
Americans were given a sheltered view of the war following the 
Tet Offensive in 1968.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
It is not a secret; people do die in wars. "Since 1945, 
more than 35 million human beings have died in 120 wars. Fifteen 
million tons of bombs were dropped on Vietnam alone-four times 
the quantity used in the entire Second World War and three 
million Vietnamese and around 58,000 Americans lost their 
lives.nl
And is the world at peace today? No. Has man learned 
anything from these past war experiences? It does not seem so. 
"For many of the world's people, technology 
means an increased capacity for human 
inhumanity to our own kind."2
The numbers of those killed or bombs dropped to destroy the 
'enemy1 do not seem to deter violence. The written accounts do 
not seem to bring an end to wars. Even the visual accounts, both 
still and motion picture, of the tragedies of war have not 
brought the destructive forces man imposes on one another to an 
end. Yet, it is the photographic accounts, as opposed to 
statistics, prose or script, that have the power to visually
*Rainer Fabian and Hans Christian Adams, Images of War; 13 0 
Years of War Photography (London: New English Library, 1983), p. 
28.
2Lance Woodruff, "Dreams of Peace," The Christian Century. 
105:451 (May 4, 1988).
2bring home the best understanding of an event.3 "Most people find 
it difficult to understand purely verbal concepts. They 
'suspect' the ear; they don't trust it. In general we feel more 
secure when things are visible, when we can 'see for 
ourselves'."4 Photography, whether still or motion-picture, 
visualizes and verifies events for the world's audience.
Information concerning events, especially global affairs, is 
usually obtained indirectly. For example, it would have been 
impossible for every American to eyewitness the Vietnam war. 
Information was, therefore, obtained through the media. "In an 
age of credibility gaps and kaleidoscopic change, many 
individuals were admittedly skeptical of certain verbally 
described events concerning the war until they were able to view 
photographic accounts of them."5 It has been the visual images 
that have brought the battlefields of war home to us "with a 
greater emotional impact than anything the printed media —
3Several individuals have studied the power of photography as 
medium for conveying information: S. Baker, Visual Persuasion.
(New York: McGraw-Hill 1961), p. 1; Harold Evans, Pictures on a 
Page (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1978) , p. 5; R. E.
Girvin, "Photography as Social Documentation," Journalism 
Quarterly. 24:207-20 (1947); Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New 
York: The Macmillan Co., 1922), p. 92; Kenrick S. Thompson, Alfred 
C. Clarke, Simon Dintz, "Reactions to My-Lai: A Visual-Verbal
Comparison," Sociology and Social Research. 58:122-129 (1974).
4M. McLuhan & Q. Fiore, The Medium is the Message: An
Inventory of Effects (New York: Bantam Books, 1967), p. 117.
5Kenrick S. Thompson and Alfred C. Clarke, "Photographic 
Imagery and the Vietnam War: An Unexamined Perspective," The
Journal of Psychology. 87:280 (1974). See also Evans, p. 4-5.
3excellent as much as the reporting has been —  has been able to 
convey.1,6
This is not to say that a photograph can bring every aspect 
of a war to those who are not there to witness the atrocities 
first hand. "No matter how powerful the images of war these 
photographs have captured, our fascination tends to outweigh our 
horror. Photography provides insulation along with access. 
Pictures don't carry the odor. War stinks. There is nothing 
worse than the stench of the unburied dead. If that smell could 
only somehow accompany the images."7
There is also the dilemma of 'truth' of a photograph.8
6"Pictures to Remember", Editorial, The Nation. (Feb. 19,
1968), p. 229.
See also Thompson, Clarke and Dintz p. 12 2-129; Oscar Patterson 
III, "Television's Living Room War in Print: Vietnam in the News 
Magazines," Journalism Quarterly. 61:35 (Spring, 1984); Michael D. 
Sherer, "Vietnam War Photos and Public Opinion," Journalism 
Quarterly. 66:391 (Summer, 1989).
7John Morris, "This We Remember", Harper * s . p. 72 (September
1972) .
8It has been argued that photography captures on film 
"reality", that is, the images pictured actually exist or did 
exist. One author views photographs as "miniatures of reality", 
whereas written prose is just an interpretation. Susan Sontag, On 
Photography (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1977), 
p. 4 & p. 154.
The issue of reality in documentary photography has been 
examined by Paul Blyton. He concludes:
"To establish meaning (and therefore reality) in a 
photographic image, we must therefore examine not only the 
information captured by the photographic process itself, but 
also consider the inactive process involving the aims and 
values of the photographer, the response of those being 
photographed and the way the photographer's symbols are read
4Roger Butterfield, former Life writer, believes "photography can 
contribute to social betterment in two ways: by being honest, and 
having a heart... an honest photo can say much more than words."9 
Photographs record history and the men and events that make it.10
During the Vietnam war, editors made the final decision of 
which stories and photographs to publish. Editors could more 
easily change the meaning of a reporter's story than they could 
alter a photograph. For instance, reporters Charles Mohr and 
Mert Perry of Time resigned in protest "over the egregious news 
management of editor Otto Fuerbringer."u Fuerbringer had 
rewritten both reporters' filed stories in the September 20,
1963, issue of Time so that the articles read the opposite of 
what the original reports had stated. Photographs, though, could 
not be altered as easily to say the opposite of what the 
negatives had pictured, as occasionally happened with the prose 
stories filed by reporters.
Editors made the decisions about page makeup and layout.
Wire service photographers complained about internal censorship 
of their photographs. Yet, photojournalists such as those
by the viewer". Paul Blyton, 'The image of work: Documentary
photography and the production of 'reality'," International
Social Science Journal. 39:415-423, (August 1987).
9Girvin, p. 217.
10Ibid, p. 218.
nSusan D. Moeller, Shooting War (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 
1989), p. 388.
5covering the war for Life, rarely thought their images were 
misused.12 Alterations of the photograph's size were necessary, 
but rarely done in such a way as to alter the original "meaning" 
of a photograph.
Photographs may vary depending on the photographer's camera 
angle, distance to a subject, timing and framing of subjects.13 
A photo can also change meaning simply by the way the image is 
cropped, burned or dodged during printing. More serious is the 
advancement in today's computer technology. A photograph can be 
completely altered to fit any format through digital retouching, 
a computer system which enables objects in a picture to be moved, 
combined, deleted or even color changed. National Geographic, a 
leader in photographic story coverage, has utilized digital 
retouching twice, once to move a pyramid so it would fit the 
vertical cover of their magazine and a second time to combine two 
photos so a Polish man's hat would be complete.14
12Ibid, p. 388,
One study has shown that the more editors know about their 
viewing audience, the better they are at choosing photographs that 
the audience will agree with. Malcolm S. MacLean & Anne L. Kao 
"Picture Selection: An Editorial Game," Journalism Quarterly.
40:230-32 (1963). See also: Paul Hightower, "The Influence of
training on Taking and Judging Photos," Journalism Quarterly. 
61:682-686 (1984).
13Blyton, p. 416.
14The techniques of burning and dodging black and white photos 
has been in use since photography's existence. Editors state that 
with digital retouching by computer, they now can use these same 
techniques with color photos and with greater ease and accuracy.
For an in depth discussion see: Sheila Reaves, "Digital
Retouching: Is there a Place for it in Newspaper Photography?"
Journal of Mass Media Ethics. 2:40-48 (Spring/Summer, 1987).
6The idea of photograph alterations has prompted many print 
publications to adopt a code of ethics for their staff. Many are 
modeled after the National Press Photographers Association's 
"Code of Ethics". This code contains two direct references 
concerning the need for truthfulness in the photojournalism 
profession.
1. "Photojournalism affords an opportunity to serve the 
public that is equalled by few other vocations and all 
members of the profession should strive by example and 
influence to maintain high standards of ethical conduct 
free of mercenary considerations of any kind.
2. It is the individual responsibility of every 
photojournalist at all times to strive for pictures 
that report truthfully, honestly and objectively."15
The need for 'reality' is augmented by the increasing number 
of persons depending on the mass media for information on current 
events, especially those occurring in other countries and 
involving conflict. The focus of this thesis is on one such 
event, the still photographic coverage of the Vietnam war. What 
did Americans view during the Vietnam war in newsmagazines? What 
scenes were captured in the photographic images and how were they 
portrayed? What subjects did the photographers shoot most often
15"Code of Ethics" News Photographer: National Press
Photographers Association 1990 Directory. 45:32.
7and what perspective did they use? These questions will be 
analyzed in this thesis.
8CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW
An elderly Buddhist monk is photographed by Malcolme Browne, 
June 12, 1963, burning himself to death in Saigon, Vietnam, in 
protest against persecution. Photographer Eddie Adams captured 
the moment Brigadier General Nguyen Ngoc Loan, national police 
chief, executed a man identified as a Vietcong terrorist during 
the Tet offensive in 1968. South Vietnamese children and 
soldiers are photographed fleeing Trangbang after a South 
Vietnamese Skyraider dropped a napalm bomb "accidentally" on June 
9, 1973. These photographs were not typical American honor and 
glory portraits of war. Contrarily, through these photographs 
the American people became witness to what some categorized as 
"war crimes."1 The worldwide protest actions against U. S. 
aggression in Vietnam were due, in part, to the fact that people 
could see in pictures what was going on there.2
Two media outlets provided Americans with these visual 
images, television and still photography. Several studies and 
reports have been published on the importance each medium played
^usan Moeller, Shooting War (New York: Basic Books, Inc.,
1989), pp. 412-413.
2Rainer Fabian and Hans Christian Adams, Images of War: 130 
Years of War Photography (London: New English Library, 1983), p. 
28.
9during the war.3
The Vietnam war coincided with the establishment of 
television in the United States. In 1941, only 10,000 TV sets 
existed in America; by the Korean War there were 10 million and 
100 million during the Vietnam war. Some researchers propose
that American television decided the Vietnam war.4 Americans . 
could view the war practically every evening from 1962 to 1973. 
"Since television has become the principal source of news for 
most Americans, it is generally assumed that the constant
exposure of this war on television was instrumental in shaping
public opinion. It has become almost a truism,... to say that
television, by showing the terrible truth of war, caused the
disillusionment of Americans with the war."5
Yet, such statistics as those regarding the number of 
television sets in American homes are all that speak for the
3Fabian, pp. 332-334; William H. Hammond, The Military and the 
Media. (Washington, D.C.:Center of Military History, U. S. Army, 
1988); Sidney W. Head and Sterling Christopher, Broadcasting in 
America (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. 1982), pp. 537-539; Herbert 
Gans, Deciding What1 s News - A Study of CBS Evening News. NBC 
Nightly News. Newsweek and Time (New York: Pantheon Books 1979); 
Derrick Mercer, Geoff Mungham and Kevin Williams The Fog of War: 
The Media on the Battlefield (London: Heinemann, 1987), pp. 223- 
233. Oscar Patterson III, "Television's living room war in print: 
Vietnam in the news magazines, Journalism Quarterly. 61:35-9 and, 
(September 1984).
4Jay Edward Epstein, Between Fact and Fiction: The Problem of 
Journalism (New York Vintage Books 1975), pp. 210-233; John 
Mueller, War Presidents. Public Opinion (New York: John Wiley and
Sons, 1973), p. 167; Patterson, p. 35; and Mercer, pp. 224-227.
^5Mercer, p. 210.
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effectiveness of the television medium in shaping public 
opinion.6 Two-thirds of all U. S. citizens state—that television 
never changed their opinion of the_war.7 ”It was the photograph 
that made the real wound in the public's consciousness."8 
Television never showed the entire war, just excerpts cut to fit 
into an evening news slot. The physical size of the TV screen 
itself made the act of men only inches tall shooting at one 
another seem unreal.9 Therefore, the still photograph may have 
had a greater impact on the American public than television.
^ "You cannot switch a photograph off like a toaster. In 
recollection, TV pictures are always strange,
'imprecise', but photography is as sharp and clear as 
■ pain. The photograph of the South Vietnamese police
j officer executing a Vietcong on a street in Saigon
i
j aroused no trauma when it was a film sequence. It
i
whizzed by like a shootout from a western movie, but as
' !
a photograph that scene of murder will be with us
i
forever."10
°Phillip Knightley, The First Causality (New York and London: 
Harcourt, Boace Javarich), 1975 pp. 413-414.
7Jay Edward Epstein, News From Nowhere (New York: Vintage Books
1973) .
8Fabian, p. 334.
Michael Arlen, Living Room War (New York: The Viking Press,
1969) p. 8.
10Fabian, p. 3 34.
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Still photography presented six memorable images of the war, 
four of which were published in magazines. These images included 
1) the Buddhist monk immolating himself in 1963, 2) General Loan 
shooting the Vietcong suspect during Tet in 1968, 3) a little 
girl accidentally hit by napalm by South Vietnamese planes, 4) 
the Marine with the Zippo lighter, 5) the armored vehicles 
leaving the citadel at Hue with its cargo of wounded Marines, and 
6) the single helicopter perched atop the U. S. Embassy in Saigon 
in April, 1975. The four images that appear to be best 
remembered for their magazine presentations are the Buddhist 
monk, General Loan and the Vietcong, the armored vehicle at Hue 
and the helicopter atop the U. S. Embassy.11
Reporter Robert Elegant describes the war as "the first time 
in modern history that the outcome of a war was determined not on 
the battlefield, but on the printed page."12
THE POWER OF A PHOTOGRAPH
Many have studied photography and provided valuable insight 
into its importance.13 For instance, MacLean and Kao concluded
nPatterson, p. 35.
" 12Robert Elegant, "How to Lose a War: Reflections of a Foreign
-Correspondent," Encounter, 57:73 (August, 1981).
v________ ___
13Several individuals have studied the power of photography as 
a medium for conveying information. S. Baker, Visual Persuasion 
(New York: McGraw-Hill 1961), p. 1, Harold Evans, Pictures on a 
Page (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1978) , p. 5; R. E. 
Girvin, "Photography as Social Documentation," Journalism 
Quarterly. 24:207-20 (1947); Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New 
York: The Macmillan Co., 1922), p.92; and Kenrick S. Thompson,
12
that, ”a good picture can tell a lot-fast-and with a big wallop 
that the reader won’t forget...It can give him an understanding 
of a story he wouldn't get otherwise.1114 As was stated earlier, 
Americans depended on 'pictures' to inform them of the Vietnam 
war and it was the print image that was most often remembered.
Further research has shown that a picture 3 columns in size, 
by itself, will stop two-thirds of the publication's readers.15 
That is, readers will pause to view the photograph whereas a 
story, written prose, may simply go unread. Also, pictures that 
accompany stories offer a reader a better understanding and will 
encourage an individual to read the text.16
Pictures also have an emotional impact on viewers.17 The 
nature of a picture,18 its subject matter, including male and
Alfred C. Clark and Simon Dintz, "Reactions to My-Lai: A Visual- 
Verbal Comparison," Sociology and Social Research. 58:122-129 
(1974) .
14Malcolm S. MacLean and Anne Li-An Kao, "Pictures Selection: 
An Editorial Game", Journalism Quarterly. 40:230 (1963).
15Bert W. Woodburn, "Reader Interest in Newspaper Pictures," 
Journalism Quarterly. 24:201 (1947).
16Charles E. Swanson, "What They Read in 130 Daily Newspapers," 
Journalism Quarterly. 32:419 (Fall, 1955).
17W. R. Hazard, "Response to News Pictures: a Study in
Perceptual Unity," Journalism Quarterly. 37:515 (1960).
18G. Norman Van Tubergen and David L. Mahsman, "Unflattering 
Photos: How People Respond," Journalism Quarterly. 51:319 (Summer,
1974) .
13
female portrayal19 and its outline can influence attitudes of the 
individual viewer.20
A photograph of a burned village or senseless shooting of 
innocent women and babies may not help those pictured, but 
hopefully those that view the photograph will be touched, reports 
photographer Eddie Adams. "I know the power of a still picture.
I know what it can do. And if a picture can help somebody some 
way or another...that1s pretty good. And to me it1s important. 
Look, l*m not out to save any world. I never was. But I do know 
what a picture can do.”21
19Roy E. Blackwood, "The Contents of News Photos: Roles
Portrayed by Men and Women," Journalism Quarterly. 60:710-14 
(1983); and Susan H. Miller, "The content of News Photos: Women's 
and Men's Roles," Journalism Quarterly. 52:70-75 (1975).
20Jean S. Kerrick, "The Influence of Captions on Picture 
Interpretation," Journalism Quarterly. 32:177-182 (Spring, 1955); 
Jean S. Kerrick, "News Pictures, Captions and the Point of 
Resolution," journalism Quarterly. 36:183-188 (1959).
For additional literature on the emotional impact of a 
photograph see Jennifer Brown, "News Photographs and the 
Pornography of Grief," Journal of Mass Media Ethic. 2:75-81 
(Spring/Summer, 1987); Garry Bryant, "Ten-Fifty P.I.: Emotion and 
the Photographer's Role," Journal of Mass Media Ethics. 2:2:32-39 
(Spring/Summer, 1987); Paul Hightower, "A Study of the Messages in 
Depression Era Photos," Journalism Quarterly. 57:495-97 (Autumn, 
1980); Patterson, pp.35-39; Caroline Rees, "The Abuse of Picture 
Power," News Statesman. 108:8-9 (Sept. 1984); Thompson, Clarke and 
Dintz, 58:122-12 9; Kenrick Thompson and Alfred C. Clarke, 
"Photographic Imagery and the Vietnam War: An Unexamined
Perspective," The Journal of Psychology. 87:279-292 (1974); Lesley 
Wizchman, "Dying on the Front Page: Kent State and the Pulitzer 
Prize," Journal of the Mass Media Ethics, 2:67-74 (Spring/Summer, 
1987).
21Moeller, p. 394.
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PHOTOGRAPHIC ACCOUNTS OF WAR
Photography of war has changed through the years according 
to the conflicts themselves, the environment of the battle and 
the participants involved. The battlefield has varied from 
pastoral landscapes to rank jungles. Fighting has fluctuated 
between trench warfare and guerrilla attacks. The sense of 'Duty' 
and 'Destiny' which prevailed during the Spanish-American War 
differed from World War I's goal of the 'War to End All Wars.' 
Coverage of one country fighting another differs from coverage of 
all-out world wars.22
Various levels of censorship have been imposed throughout 
history.23 Technological advances in military equipment and 
shifts in the ethics of war have also strongly influenced how (or 
whether) photographs of conflicts could be taken and how they 
could be presented to the public. These variations have 
ultimately affected the public's perception of each war as shaped 
by the press.
Photographic technology has also influenced war coverage 
through the years. Camera sizes, the lengths of lenses and film 
speeds have restricted photographers in the images they could 
capture. Photographers were restricted more by their cameras' 
bulky sizes and film speeds during the Crimean and Spanish- 
American Wars than by any imposed regulations. During the more
22Ibid, pp. 4-6.
23Ibid, p. 5.
15
recent Vietnam conflict, photographers enjoyed the leisure of 
highly advanced equipment and film along with limited 
restrictions on coverage.24
Other factors have also affected war photography. Still 
cameras could never capture the sounds or smells of war. Night 
photography was limited to the fireworks of the artillery. 
Finally, shooting photographs during the daytime could be quite 
hazardous. A photographer had to be at the scene of action, with 
his head up, to see and photograph the actions of a battle.
During the Vietnam war, from 1964 to 1973, "more than 85 percent 
of the newsmen wounded and 60 percent of those killed were either 
still or motion picture photographers.1,25 Photographers have to 
be physically present to get their pictures, whereas a journalist 
may sit behind the lines in safety. This difference between the 
two media also gives credibility to the validity of photographic 
documentation.26
All these factors have influenced the photographic coverage 
of each war throughout history. Only a few researchers have 
studied photographic coverage of wars.27
^Ibid.
25Michael D. Sherer, "The Khaki Colored Camera." unpublished 
paper, prepared for J511 Readings in Journalism History, Dr. Sharon 
Murphy (Fall 1980) p. 4.
26Moeller, p. 9.
27Patterson, pp. 35-39; Michael Sherer, "Invasion of Poland: 
Photos in Four American Newspapers," Journalism Quarterly. 61:422- 
26 (Summer 1984) ; Sherer, pp. 391-395; Thompson and Clarke, pp. 
279-292; and Thompson, Clarke and Dintz, pp. 122-129.
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The Crimean War
War photo records of our 1 errors1, if war can thus be called 
this, date back to the Crimean War, 1854-1856. Four decades had 
passed since the British had fought a battle. The approach to 
the Crimean War was thus one of leisure by both soldiers and 
civilians.
The truth of the battlefield was brought home to England by 
reporter William Howard Russel in his columns in The Times 
Newspaper. His stories raised much skepticism among the English 
people. Prince Albert realized that to restore confidence in the 
conduct of the war some form of counter-propaganda was necessary, 
and "what better form could there be than the newly discovered 
medium that never lied-the camera?"28
Roger Fenton, Queen Victoria's court photographer, was sent 
to the Crimean to record what was "really happening". From 
Fenton's photographs it was learned that in most cases the camera 
does not lie directly, but it can lie brilliantly by omission.
His photos portrayed a war "where everything looked ship-shape 
and everyone was happy. They showed well-dressed officers and 
men eating, drinking, or smoking; a convivial party between 
French and English troops; quiet scenes of a mortar battery; and 
the interiors of captured forts after the bodies had been 
removed."29 He returned to London with 3 65 plates for
28Knightley, p. 15.
29Ibid.
17
development and was believed to be the first war photographer, 
even though his photos were more propagandistic in nature.
Actually, a Texas photographer was probably the first war 
photographer of record. This photographer, although his or her 
name is unknown, made ten daguerreotypes of General John E. Wool 
and his troops as they rode into the town of Saltillo, Mexico, in 
1848.30 These Mexican War daguerreotypes portrayed staged or 
static images of battle, since the equipment to photograph action 
or take several images at one time did not yet exist.31 The wet- 
plate images of the Crimean War and American Civil War also 
experienced these restrictions in coverage.
Although he may not have been the first war photographer, 
Fenton seems to have been the first to be supported by his 
government, the Royal family. He converted a wine merchant*s 
wagon into a complete darkroom, with the words * Photographic Van* 
printed on the sides. Poses during this time took from ten to 
sixty seconds. Therefore, the "most dramatic portrayals of war's 
realities that he could manage were taken after the battles."32 
His only restriction from Prince Albert was not to photograph 
"dead bodies". Instead, his photographs portrayed the strategic 
happenings of the war.
American Civil War
30Fabian, p. 77.
31Moeller, p. 24.
32Fabian, p. 80.
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Five years later, on April 11, 18 61, the first shot was 
fired in the American Civil War. The situation was exactly the 
opposite of the Crimean War. "Instead of a correspondent, it was 
a photographer who documented the war for what it was."33 
Matthew B. Brady received letters of recommendation to cover the 
war from President Lincoln and Secret Service boss Alan 
Pinkerton.
Brady sent twenty photographers to the front during the war. 
"For a total of $100,000 the impresario of civil war photography 
equipped each operator with a portable darkroom and had regular 
base camps set up near the major battle fields with depots for 
chemicals, glass plates and slides."34 The pictures once again 
depicted preambles or aftermaths of soldiers and battlefields. 
Actually, combat or scenes of action could not be captured until 
faster films and smaller cameras evolved. Yet, the coverage of 
the Civil War was the first systematic attempt to document a 
conflict in its entirety.35 Unfortunately, the technology for 
converting these photographs into half-tone blocks for use in 
newspapers was not yet available. Brady's photographs could only 
be seen at his New York studio.
Soanish-American War
33Ibid, p. 83.
34Ibid, p. 84.
35Moeller, pp. 24-25.
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On the evening of February 15, 1898, the battleship USS 
Maine blew up in the Havana Harbor, killing 260 of its crew. The 
press quickly blamed the Spanish colonial government in Cuba. 
President McKinley told Congress the war in Cuba must stop. On 
April 25 the United States declared war, voting to support the 
independence of Cuba.
The first published half-tones of a major conflict appeared 
in the press, causing a subtle shift in America's perception of 
war. A war could now be viewed through the press in one's own 
home.
Little censorship was imposed on the photographers who went 
to Cuba to discover the romance of war for themselves. Yet, when 
it became apparent that the press was acting as spies for the 
Spaniards through their publications, stricter enforcement of the 
censorship was imposed. The New York Evening Journal reported 
that a photographer who gave information on the strength of 
American fortifications could be levied a $25,000 fine or 10 
years ' imprisonment.36
During this war and World War I, battlefield photographs 
were used on photographic stereoviewing cards which sold by the 
thousands. A stereo card was two nearly identical photographic 
prints that were mounted on a rectangular piece cardboard and 
looked at with a binocular-like viewer. The two prints seen 
together produced an illusion of a three-dimensional image.
Stereo cards were produced depicting technological achievements,
36Ibid, p. 50.
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scenes of natural beauty and prominent persons of the United 
States. Yet, the cards depicting scenes of war were the 
perennial favorites. Keystone View Company "sold more cards from 
its series on the sinking of the USS Maine than any other title 
in its extensive catalog."37
Photographs most often pictured troops at a distance and 
death was never shown. The self-censored Spanish-American War 
photographs presented "the image of a glorious (American) mission 
to free Cuba from the degenerate colonialism of Spain."
The number of photographers covering the War was also 
limited. Newspapers and magazines sent dozens of reporters, but 
only a few sent photographers. Yet, those who were there are 
credited with covering the first war where photojournalism had a 
significant presence in the media.38
World War I
In World War I, death was only for heroes. No one died in 
the mud, was blinded in a gas attack or torn apart by shrapnel in 
the published pictures of the press. The main task of 
photographers covering the western front was to compile a 
historical record, not provide newspapers with material; thus 
their 'realistic' photographs were never released.39
The Signal Corps Section, established in 1917, was
37Ibid, p. 25.
38Ibid, p. 48.
39Knightley, p. 99.
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commissioned to oversee the military photography of events. 
Newspapers and magazines now had a second source of photographs 
to choose from besides those supplied by their contracted 
photographers.
All countries in the War-Austria, Germany, England, France, 
Italy and the United States-imposed restrictions on photographers 
and journalists and often banned them from the front and behind 
the lines. In 1915, photographer Jimmy Hare wrote that "to so 
much as make a snapshot without official permission in writing 
means arrest. "40
All photographs taken in the American zone were sent to the 
Signal Corps laboratory for developing, printing and censoring. 
During the American engagement in 1917 and 1918, publishers, 
editors, writers and photographers had to conform to the spirit 
as well as the letter of censorship. The freedom experienced 
during previous wars was gone. Still the American public 
demanded coverage, both written and pictorial, of the daily 
events. The Times established the Mid-Week Pictorial in 1914 to 
provide more extensive war coverage. Other publications, such as 
Collier1s and the New York Times, often allotted half a dozen or 
more pages per issue to stories and illustrations.41
Yet, no photographs of dead Americans ever appeared in the 
press and only a few pictures of wounded soldiers were ever 
published. American property was never shown destroyed either,
40Moeller, p. 110.
41Ibid, p. 133.
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only that of the enemy. Photographs were approved for release to 
U.S. news publications by American Signal Corps censors only if 
they would not have a depressing effect upon the American public. 
"One of the most successful photos from the war was entitled 
'There'i in reference to the popular song 'Over there, over 
there, send the word, send the word to beware, That the Yanks are 
coming...' The photo silhouetted soldiers running against 
backdrops of barbed wire and luring skies."42 The photo 
embellished what Americans back home believed about war: that it 
was dangerous but romantic.
World War II
In World War II, photographers were once again censored from 
the real carnage. "Bombs tended to fall in streaming sunshine 
and we were allowed to show just a little of the suffering 
caused, but not enough to evoke pity."43 This was true of all 
the belligerent powers.
The professional war photographer was born on the 
battlefields of the Second World War. Civilian photojournalists 
were eyewitnesses to decisive battles such as Pearl Harbor and 
Rommel's defeat in North Africa, to the invasion of Normandy and 
the fall of Paris. Yet, General MacArthur had all journalists 
removed from Hiroshima prior to the atomic bombing, an event that 
changed the entire course of the war. "The citizens of America
42Ibid, p. 146.
43Fabian, p. 30.
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had only been allowed to see what the military considered its 
triumphant signal, the mushroom cloud of the bomb."44
Photography was used to create heroes, not to show the 
bloody reality of war. Any "unAmerican" derogatory photos were 
censored. Joe Rosenthal of the Associated Press took the best 
known photo of the war in the Pacific, the raising of the flag 
over Iwo Jima. This picture was used on a postage stamp, became 
the symbol of the seventh War Bond drive, was used on three and 
one-half million posters and over 175,000 car cards, and was the 
inspiration for the hundred-ton bronze memorial to the Marines at 
the edge of the Arlington National Cemetery.45 Yet, this was a 
'posed1 flag raising. The conquer of the hill and original 
smaller flag raising had occurred three hours earlier. The 
'posed' photograph, though, made for a more heroic picture.46
KOREAN WAR
The Korean War began as a civil conflict among right and 
left factions of a formerly colonial state. Yet, "the war soon 
escalated into a superpower showdown and a brutal campaign of 
attrition."47 The United States and its allies faced for the 
first time an unwinnable war. The war which the U. S. entered in
^Ibid, p. 247.
45Knightley, p. 2 95.
46Fabian, p. 2 65.
47Callum A. MacDonald, Korea; The War Before Vietnam (New York: 
The Free Press 1986), p. 3.
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June, 1950, originally began as a North-South Korean dispute.
This dispute was overshadowed by the Soviet and American power 
systems behind each nation. Unification, their common war aim, 
was never realized.
From MacArthur to the lowliest GI, there was a disastrous 
underestimation of the strength and tenacity of the advancing 
enemy. Yet, defeat was never considered by anyone. Whereas in 
World War II the soldier was portrayed as a hero, in Korea, he 
was shown as victim. Soldiers were pictured with looks of 
complete uncertainty about what they were doing.48 World War II 
pictured Marines triumphantly raising the U. S. flag on Iwo 
Jima - "a symbol of America's Manifest Destiny."49 Korea's most 
memorable photos include a man cradling another man, who had just 
lost a friend, in his arms.
The press photographers in Korea showed the tragedy from two 
sides: the uncertainty of the American soldiers and the 
atrocities faced by a country being torn in half.50 The first 
correspondents were witness to major American and allied defeats. 
Marguerite Higgins of the New York Herald Tribune quoted a young 
lieutenant, "Are you correspondents telling the people back home 
the truth? Are you telling them that out of one platoon of
48Alvin PI Sanoff, "How photography shapes the face of battle," 
U. S. News & World Report. 106:62-63 (April 3, 1989).
49Ibid, p. 62.
50John Morris, "This We Remember," Harper's. p. 73-74, 
(September 1972).
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twenty men, we have three left? Are you telling them that we 
have nothing to fight with, and that it is an utterly useless 
war?"51 Correspondents who did tell the story of those first few 
weeks received a harsh reprimand.52
At first, a system of voluntary censorship existed for 
correspondents in the Korean Police Action. This voluntary code 
consisted of the ”'ordinary Field Security catalogue' which 
requested nondisclosure of 'names and positions of 
units...figures of friendly casualties...strength of 
reinforcements... or any such information as may be of aid and 
comfort to the enemy.'"53
Only one military telephone line existed from press 
headquarters at Taejon to Tokyo for use in transmitting stories. 
The military often bumped stories, claiming priority over the 
line. During the first six months, reporters found it easier to 
hand deliver their stories to Japan. Photographers had to send 
their images to San Francisco via the Army Signals Corps radio, 
at commercial rates. The military often bumped these 
transmissions as well.54 By early August, 1950, 330 
correspondents from 19 countries were covering the war. The 
United States alone had 163. The U. N. perimeter was only 120 
miles long; thus the battlefield was crowded and competition
51Knightley, pp. 336-337.
52Moeller, p. 256.
53Ibid, p. 279.
54Ibid, pp. 277-278.
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among journalists keen.55
On September 15, 1950, General MacArthur launched an 
amphibious landing at Inchon, an act he hoped would end the War. 
Although the military considered it an "outstanding" success, the 
complete lack of secrecy by allies had the press reporting it as 
a disaster. In Tokyo, the press club called it "Operation Common 
Knowledge". The military ferried the four news agency chiefs, 
personal guests of General MacArthur, to Inchon on board the 
command ship McKinley. MacArthur counted on these reporters to 
get the "official" word out quickly, but the military did not 
consult with the rest of the press before this mission.
Therefore, although press barges loaded with daily newspaper 
correspondents were among the first assault wave, many did not 
get ashore until the second or third day.56 This in itself upset 
many reporters and photographers and added to the confusion over 
what was happening during the mission.
Author Phillip Knightley states that "it needed the 
skeptical eye of a British correspondent, James Cameron of the 
Picture Post, to put all the inflated claims, hyperbole, 
bungling, and butchery into perspective.
'This was the operation to end the war. This was the 
pay-off to take the Thirty Billion Dollar Police Action out 
of the red at last. This was MacArthur's final argument in 
his personal one-man deal with destiny... Then when it came,
55Ibid, pp. 274-275.
56Knightley, pp. 340-341.
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it stunned for a while. All the fear came first. Perhaps we 
shall never understand how it came off as it did, nor why 
the enemy failed to do any of the three things that could 
have crippled the whole enterprise. Anyhow, God was on the 
side of the big battalions; they were even that big.1"57 
Within weeks, allied and American soldiers recaptured Seoul 
along with the capitol of North Korea, Pyongyang. Yet, once 
North Korean forces were joined by the Chinese, the American and 
allied forces were faced with retreat from the capitol.
Reporters began wondering if South Korea was worth saving.
Extreme criticism towards the United Nations provoked MacArthurfs 
headquarters to stop voluntary censorship on December 21 and 
impose full military censorship on news messages, broadcasts, 
magazine articles and photographs from Korea.58 Now censors 
withheld all pictures of wounded for thirty days or until the 
next of kin could be notified. Photographs of large numbers of 
wounded and dead were banned unless some chance existed that they 
might "inspire patriotism or determination or otherwise 
contribute to the war effort."59 (The absence of censorship in 
Vietnam made these guidelines unenforceable).
In December, 1948, the United Nations placed its seal of 
approval on the new Republic of Korea (ROK) organized by Syngman 
Rhee in Seoul, Korea. Rheefs new regime claimed to speak for all
57Ibid, p. 341.
58Ibid, p. 345.
59Hammond, p . 237.
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Koreans. The North Korean state, not wanting to receive an 
adverse appearance by South Korea's new political regime, 
established a Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 
Pyongyang under Kim II Sung. The DPRK claimed to be a national 
state, also.60
Rhee's regime appeared strong enough to unite the two 
states, yet its military actions were not without question. The 
press pushed to show the true atrocities of this war between the 
two Korean countries. British photographer Bert Hardy pictured 
North Korean political prisoners, roped and manacled, crunched 
tightly in trucks on their way to execution by South Korean 
soldiers. These photographs were suppressed by the proprietor of 
one British newspaper, the Picture Post, as they were going to 
press. Contributing writer James Cameron subsequently resigned 
from the Post and sold a copy of his story to the Daily Worker, 
also a British newspaper. Similar stories and photos continued 
to raise questions about practices in Korea, especially those 
dealing with prisoners, in local branches of the UN Associations 
and the Labour Party. Foreign Offices tried to play down the 
stories, but there was concern that the actions of Rhee might 
"undermine public support for the war and alienate other 
Asians."61 Ernest Bevin, British Foreign Secretary, briefly 
raised this issue with Washington on October 5, 1950. No 
official condemnation of Rhee's tactics was ever made, "since it
60MacDonald, p. 15.
61Ibid, pp. 60-61.
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was believed that this would merely play into the hands of the 
communists.1162
As in previous wars, the climate played an important role in 
the coverage by photographers. Life photographer David Douglas 
Duncan accompanied marines on their retreat to Changjin 
Reservoir. The winds created subzero temperatures forcing Duncan 
to warm up his camera inside his clothes between each shot. One 
Marine he photographed was struggling to eat a can of frozen 
beans. Duncan quoted the Marine as wanting nothing more from God 
than "tomorrow".63
Duncan and Carl Mydans, also a Life photographer, became two 
of the most famous journalists in Korea.64 This was due in part 
to their ability not only to pictorially illustrate a scene, but 
to rhetorically describe a situation as well.
Press photographers used primarily the Speed Graphic Camera 
for shooting; 35mm cameras were employed only in exceptional 
circumstances. Yet, the military civilian photographers 
preferred the 35mm Leica or Bolsey camera. These were lighter, 
had more depth of field and held more film. Photographers were 
usually close enough to the action to use short focal length
62Ibid, p. 61.
63Knightley, p. 343.
^Moeller, p. 273.
Carl Mydans describes photojournalism as the best job in 
the world. For a brief account of Mydans' career see: Carl 
Mydans, "The Best Job in the World," Time: 150 Years of
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lenses like the 35 or 50mm.65
In summary, the photographer experienced three main 
obstacles in covering the Korean War:
1) The hazards of having to actually be at the scene of 
combat posed life-threatening situations for the photographers.
If the enemy was not firing over the photographers* head, the 
freezing temperatures barred picture-taking. Film froze, broken 
shutters would stick and the photographers fingers would become 
too stiff to even load a roll of film.
2) After the Chinese entered the war, much of the fighting 
occurred at night hampering picture taking.
3) Finally, the photographer had to decide when to lay down 
his cameras and give aid to another. Carl Mydans states,
I have never known a good war photographer who was not a 
deeply compassionate man and who did not make his decision 
in such a circumstance on the side of compassion.66 
The photographers came to record the facts of the war, the 
brutality of man against man. Coming so soon after World War II, 
and being covered by so many of the same war photographers, few 
came hoping that their photographs would prevent future wars.
The Vietnam War
World War II ended with much fanfare - Americans had won yet 
another war. The Korean War was an unsatisfying conflict, "whose
65Moeller, p. 282.
“Ibid, pp. 289-290.
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ultimate settlement was ambivalent but at least comprehensible in 
conventional terms."67 The Vietnam war began with the same 
American spirit "for the cause"f but this view never caught on.
It became the longest war America ever fought. By the mid­
sixties most doubted the political and military strategies of the 
war, and a large percentage felt the war itself was wrong after 
the Tet offensive in 1968.68
Anti-war photographs were first published during the Korean 
and Vietnam wars. "In contrast to the Crimean War, where 
pictures were taken so as not to disturb the peace of the English 
fireside, to the First World War, where photographers worked for 
the glory of the Fatherland, and the Second World War, where the 
soldiers of the Allied power and the German Wehmacht were 
portrayed as participants in some deadly Olympiad; in contrast to 
all the wars of the past, the war photographers who worked in 
Vietnam had every intention of nauseating, disturbing and 
shocking." 69
Vietnam pictures portrayed the civilian rather than the 
soldier as the victim. Americans faced the fact that their own 
boys were killing innocent women and children.70
The Vietnam war became the first that Americans could view 
daily on their evening news or in the print media. "Media
67Ibid, p. 326.
68Ibid, p. 327.
69Fabian, p. 30.
70Sanoff, pp. 62-63.
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critics and historians seem to agree that it was only with the 
Vietnam experience that the media played a decisive role...in the 
way in which the war was won or lost."71 Major General Winant 
Sidle, chief of information for General William Westmoreland, 
believed more stringent rules were necessary when assigning 
reporters to Vietnam. "He argued, 'I believe reporting of the 
war would have been much more objective. And this might well 
have changed the entire outcome.'"72
Vietnam war coverage originally focused on the American 
military initiative such as troop landings, air strikes, search- 
and-destroy missions. This coverage presented a picture of a 
slow but sure progress in the war. "With the Tet offensive in 
1968, the focus changed radically to stories of chaos, confusion 
and near collapse."73 Serious doubts about the United States' 
ability to win the war crept into editorials and story 
conclusions. "The Tet offensive was thus the last straw in a 
lengthy process of increasing uncertainty about the war."74
On November 1, 1968, President Johnson announced a halt to 
the bombing of North Vietnam and the commencement of serious 
negotiations aimed at peace. Accordingly, the networks changed 
the focus of their coverage from the battlefields to the
71Patterson, p. 35.
72Moeller, p. 3 50.
73Epstein, p. 22 6.
74Gans, p. 200.
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negotiation tables of Paris.75
Until late in 1967, an overwhelming majority of the American 
public approved of the Vietnam war according to opinion polls.
The Gallup 'trend' poll indicated that "until mid-1967 the number 
of Americans who agreed with the decision to send American troops 
to Vietnam actually increased."76 It was not until October,
1967, that the poll showed a higher percentage of people against 
the war than for it. By the time of the Tet offensive in 1968, 
"support for the war suffered a slow and somewhat ambiguous 
decline while opposition grew at a slightly faster rate."77
On January 29, 1968, while the South Vietnamese celebrated 
Tet, the lunar new year, Vietcong units launched coordinated 
attacks on every major city in South Vietnam. The Americans 
suddenly found themselves besieged, and Saigon turned into a 
battlefield for the first time.78 By February 5, 3 0 of the 44 
provincial capitals had been attacked. The Communist offensive 
abruptly shattered the "impression created by the (media) 
coverage of an American military in control, gradually making 
progress and holding the initiative...Merely by stepping out of 
their hotels, correspondents found themselves willy-nilly in the 
midst of bloody fighting."79 The war was increasingly seen to be
75Epstein, p. 227.
76Ibid, p. 211.
77Moeller, p. 56.
78Epstein, p. 22 0.
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a long, bloody affair, not one that American troops could bring 
to a hasty end.
Hallin reports that Vietnam coverage shifted from a balance 
quite favorable to administration policy prior to the Tet 
offensive, to a considerably less favorable balance after Tet.80 
This view was based on statements by journalists which "offered 
explicit opinions on the war, drew explicit conclusions about 
controversial issues (e.g. a conclusion that one side or the 
other was winning), or used strong evaluative language (words 
like ’butchery1 or 'massacre') without attribution."81
Critical coverage from Vietnam began in 1961, when the New 
York Times sent veteran war correspondent Homer Bigart to Saigon. 
Bigart had received two Pulitzer Prizes covering wars, but hated 
war. "He gained the fame of legend as the mentor of a whole 
class of Vietnam correspondents who emulated his insistence on 
reporting demonstrable fact, his skepticism of official p.r., his 
lack of confidence in the whole enterprise."82 Bigart served as 
mentor to, among others, David Halberstam of the New York Times; 
Malcolm Browne, Peter Arnett and photographer Horst Faas of the
80Daniel Hallin, "The Media, the War in Vietnam and political 
support: a critique of the thesis of an oppositional media," 
Journal of Politics. 46:2-24.
81lbid, p. 7.
82James Boylan, "Declaration of Independence. Vietnam: the
first phase," Columbia Journalism Review. pp. 3 3-34, 
(November/December 1986).
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Associated Press: and Neil Sheehan of the United Press 
International.
Vietnam, being the first daily "media” war, brought out 
different types of photographers. Accreditation could be easily 
acquired by anyone stating he was a free-lance photographer.
This, along with two letters from news agencies or newspapers 
saying they would be willing to buy their photographs, was all 
that was needed to get a Military Assistance Command Vietnam 
(MACV) card. The Associated Press wrote letters for almost 
anyone, with the second letter usually coming from the 
photographer's hometown paper. AP and UPI even furnished newly 
accredited photographers cameras, film, light meters, and 
instructions to get them started.83 Yet most stayed only three 
months to prove they were willing to serve and get themselves 
promoted. Others came to avoid the draft.84
Photographers Sean Flynn, son of Hollywood actor Errol 
Flynn, and Rick Merron and Dana Stone were classified as hippies 
by many colleagues. None of these men had any professional 
camera experience. Stone could not even change the film in his 
camera.85 These journalists rode to the front line on Hondas and 
experimented with cameras mounted on rifle barrels. When a 
soldier fired, the camera shutter clicked, capturing a man being
83Moeller, p. 359.
84Lunn, p . 61.
85Moeller, p. 359.
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shot.86 Flynn and Stone are both still listed as missing in 
action in Cambodia.
Photographer Tim Page also rode around with Flynn and Stone. 
Page arrived in Vietnam at the age of twenty. Although many 
classified Page as a hippie, also, he made quite a living for 
himself in Vietnam. A series of his photographs appeared in Life 
on September 3, 1965, covering six pages. Life paid him $6,000 
for these photos. Most of his photographs were taken in areas 
other photographers were not willing to go. Page states that 
although "no one wants to admit it, there is a lot of sex appeal 
and a lot of fun in weapons. Where else but Vietnam would a man 
get a chance to play with a supersonic jet, drive a tank, or 
shoot off a rocket, and even get highly paid for it?"87
Yet, Page*s daring efforts for such high paying photographs 
often resulted in personal injury. In 1969 he was assisting with 
loading wounded into a helicopter when shrapnel hit him in the 
head. It took him over eighteen months to recover and medical 
bills ran over $13 6,000. Time and Life, the two publications 
which had bought most of his photos, undertook the paying of his 
hospital bills.88
While recovering in the hospital, Page received an offer to 
write a book that would take the glamour out of war. His 
response: "Take the glamour out of war! I mean, how the bloody
86Knightley, p. 419.
87Ibid.
88Knightley, p. 42 0.
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hell can you do that?...Ohhh, war is good for you, you can't take 
the glamour out of that!”89
Contrasting views were presented among the photographers. 
Whereas reporters were pressed to put something on the wire, some 
photographers had more lenient deadlines.90 David Douglas 
Duncan, Life photographer, seemed to be dedicated to the American 
soldier and the burdens placed on him. He chose to present the 
military aspects of the war. By comparison, Larry Burrows 
portrayed the non-military and human consequences of the wartime 
situation. He was concerned with the entire human element. His 
imagery involved women, children or the aged. Duncan did not 
portray this side at all. Burrows was much more concerned with 
the intimate, personal-social effects of the war, while Duncan 
preferred to show a broader perspective in his images.91 A 
pivotal point in Burrows' career came while shooting the death of 
a Yankee Papa 13 helicopter crew member.
In January, 1964, one year before American ground troops 
were sent in to assist South Vietnam, Burrows requested 
permission from Life Magazine to do a photo essay concentrated on 
one helicopter company. Burrows stated that this would allow "a 
dramatic, candid close-in look at the most photogenic phase of 
the U.S. commitment in South Vietnam.”92 It would show "the
89Fabian, p. 321.
90Moeller, p. 354.
91Thompson and Clarke, pp. 279-288.
92Moeller, p. 393.
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readers how big a part Americans were playing in the war and how 
hopeless it would be for the Vietnamese if the U.S. withdrew 
their help."93
The essay received approval and Burrows began work on the 
story in April, 1965. The crew received orders to drop off South 
Vietnamese troops into a suspected enemy staging area. After 
their third drop under heavy fire, Yankee Papa 13 went to aid 
another company, Papa 3, that had gone down. Papa 13 Crew Chief 
Jim Farley tried unsuccessfully to rescue the pilot from his 
seat. The pilot had been shot in the neck and Farley believed he 
was dead. He was later rescued by another helicopter's crew. 
Farley returned to his own helicopter and was airlifted out with 
Papa 3's gunner and co-pilot, both of whom were badly wounded.
The gunner of Yankee Papa 3 had a smashed left shoulder and the 
co-pilot had been fatally hit below his armpit and his flak 
jacket (a jacket worn to protect one's body from bursting 
shells). Burrows recalled later:
If there was any sound coming from the pilot's mouth, it was 
drowned by the noise of the helicopter. He looked pale and I 
wondered how long he could hold on. Then blood started to 
come from the mouth and nose; the boys worked harder. A 
glazed look came into the eyes and he was dead...I tried to 
find a way in which to hide the pilot's face when the boys 
were working on him, feeling that should a photograph be 
used, it would be harder on the family. Yet it would bring
93Ibid.
home to many people that this was a war and people were 
getting killed. It was important to show such a scene and 
for all to realize that despite the pretty pattern that
helicopters made when flying at 1,500 feet, life can be 
hell."94
Seventeen of the 25 pictures actually used in the essay were 
taken from this one single mission. AP photographer Eddie Adams 
stated, "Up to that time (of the Yankee Papa 13 essay), I had 
always thought Larry Burrows was a so-so photographer... But from 
that time on...his pictures just became greater and greater...I 
don't know what it did to him-he always had a good drive. But 
afterwards, whenever he'd do anything, it was like this guy can't 
miss."95 Yet, most photographers did not have such liberal 
deadlines.
,-^The improvement in communications technology lessened the 
problem of taking photographs and transferring the images back to 
the states. No longer did photographers rely on the bulky Speed 
Graphic Cameras. The 35mm camera was now in universal use, 
providing a wider range of lenses and faster shutter speeds. 
Photographers were not restricted to black and white film since 
color film had been developed for use in a wide latitude of
stories and sending film or prints back home via radio circuits
lighting situations. Finally, the facilities for covering
^Ibid, p. 394.
95Ibid, p. 355.
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or air transports were "unparalleled.1,96 Dirck Halstead once 
stated, "Communications are so good, and we're so sensitive to 
communications, that when our news-side sends out a bulletin on a 
big story, we'll get a query back from New York within ten 
minutes, asking when the photographs can be expected."97 In 
previous wars, simply getting one photograph was an 
accomplishment. During the Vietnam war, with the advanced camera 
equipment and film available, New York bureaus expected a 
constant flow of photographs. When a major battle occurred, the 
demand for photographs was immediate and insatiable.98
The major transmission problem faced was that of securing 
time on the radio circuits in advance, and then hoping to have 
around 20 photographs to send back. Filling the time with usable * 
photos forced photographers to concentrate on the immediate 
fighting in place of more in-depth coverage like that of Duncan.
An in-depth photo essay could take days or weeks to produce. The 
photographers had to reserve air time daily to supply to their 
news services and therefore had to have photographs to send every 
day. Therefore, photographers spent most of their time running 
after the "hot" news story while a lot of the good feature 
photographs got away.99
96Ibid, p. 372.
"Les Barry, "The New War Photographers," Popular Photography, 
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98Ibid, p. 138.
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Women also came to Vietnam. Many had simply tagged along 
with their boyfriend journalists. This was the first war in 
which such a large number of women covered the daily battles, 
several of whom were, or were to become, prominent journalists. 
Catherine Leroy arrived in Saigon in 1966 with $500 and a Leica 
camera. She had no prior professional camera experience. Yet, 
The Associated Press1s Saigon photography chief Horst Faas rated 
Leroy as "one of the best four or five freelancers" in 
Vietnam.100
While photographing the Marines near the Demilitarized Zone, 
Leroy was hit by mortar. "Her jaw muscles were cut...and when she 
returned to the field a month later she could only open her mouth 
a little. That was why she carried baby food instead of combat 
rations".101 Leroy won an overseas Press Club award for her 
photographs.
Other prominent female journalists included Elizabeth Pond 
of the Christian Science Monitor. Kate Webb of United Press 
International and Michele Ray, a French freelancer. Each of 
these women was captured by the enemy and later released to write 
stories of her experiences. Dickey Chapelle, photographer for 
National Geographic, published the first picture of an "American 
ready for combat."102 Chapelle was killed in Vietnam in 1965.
At the beginning of the war only a handful of journalists
100Moeller, p. 359.
101Lunn, p. 62.
102Moeller, p. 359.
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had been accredited in Saigon. By the climax of the Tet 
offensive, 637 war reporters were registered at the U. S. Army 
headquarters in Saigon. Yet, according to Malcolm Browne, who 
spent fourteen years in Vietnam working for the Associated Press, 
ABC, New York Times and as a freelancer, only a hard core of 
fifteen to twenty reporters supplied 99 percent of the important 
news and photography. Browne states,
"the rest were groupies and intelligence types and 
religious fanatics and (who) knows what. There were 
people who had come over on subsidized tours on behalf 
of their papers but really paid for by the Pentagon- 
huge numbers of people like that who had really nothing 
to do with journalism...In television there are the 
correspondents who were involved and certainly 
cameramen, but there was also this gigantic 
infrastructure [of technicians, producers, and 
analysts] who were formally accredited as newspeople 
but who were in fact just there for working some of the 
ntis and bolts."103
The journalists in Vietnam seemed to live a life of leisure. 
"The correspondent could take a taxi from Saigon in the morning, 
drive down Route 4 to the MeKong Delta, lunch at a French seafood 
restaurant on four courses and three wines, go on to discuss the 
military situation with a South Vietnamese officer, and be back
103Ibid, p. 358.
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in Saigon before dusk."104 With a few days off, the journalist 
could go to Da Nang. Here one could shower, have a steak dinner 
and sun bathe on China Beach.
For many journalists the war was like a western movie staged 
for their cameras. When an American soldier's dormitory came 
under fire, the press showed up to film the incident. As if 
anticipating the media, the military police stood at the ready, 
with their backs against the five story brick building, M16's 
leveled and ready to fire. Two American camera crews raced 
around filming and setting up lights on various corners. It 
seemed that the real bullets were not allowed to hit the non- 
combatant cameramen in the middle.105 Photographers and 
journalists were ushered to various battle sites by military 
personnel. Those who ventured into the battle zones soon 
realized the extreme danger of war. A journalist could easily 
lower his head during heavy firing, but a photographer had to 
have his head up, literally, to get the shot. For Don McCullin, 
holding his head up was part of journalistic mortality. "I don't 
believe you can see over the top unless you stick your neck 
out."106 Obtaining action film was the reason that a large 
portion of the 63 journalists were killed in Vietnam. 
Photographers and cameramen also had to lug huge cameras around. 
Yet, taking on the dangers of a photographer and the added
104Fabian, p. 321.
105Lunn, p. 60.
106Fabian, p. 324.
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burdens of camera equipment meant big profits in Vietnam from 
the United States. Those killed were mostly non-Americans who 
chanced their luck with American TV reporters for $600 a week, a 
salary four to ten times higher than most could earn 
elsewhere.107
Transportation was more accessible for journalists during 
the Vietnam war than ever before. MACV personnel arranged more 
than 4,700 in-country trips for journalists from October 1965 to 
August 1966. Air Vietnam, the commercial airline, and the local 
train system were also available.108
Photographers also had the leisure of deciding what they 
would cover. "'Troops are invariably only as good as their 
commander,1 Horst Faas would say when he was weighing up the 
risks entailed in a mission.1,109 This caution once saved his 
life. After viewing photos of a combat zone, he decided the 
mission was suicide. He was right. During the first few seconds
of the landing, three soldiers were killed.
Other photographers used survival techniques as well. Some 
would smear night-fighting make-up on their chrome camera parts 
to avoid exposing themselves to the enemy at night by reflections
in the moonlight. Ramano Cagnoni blackened his face. Catherine
Leroy carried a sign in front of her with the words "French Press
107Lunn, pp. 59-60.
108Moeller, p. 363.
109Fabian, p. 324.
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from Paris" on it.110 All journalists wore the American military 
greens in order to resemble an American soldier so they wouldn't 
be shot by one.111
Censorship was minimal during the war, but the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs, issued a letter to all 
American media outlets demanding restraint. Photographers were 
not restricted from accompanying units, but were advised not to 
use photos of wounded men until their families had been notified. 
Also, shots of "operations in field hospitals and photographs 
that may stir up unpleasant thoughts, such as those of maimed 
bodies, obvious expressions of agony, serious shock, or 
circumstances that cast doubt on the patient's chances of 
recovery," were to be kept under wraps.112
South Vietnamese censorship during the last years of the 
Diem government proved more challenging and dangerous than that 
imposed by the United States. Following Browne's photograph of a 
Buddhist Monk's self-immolation, the Diem regime "recognized the 
immense propaganda value of pictures."113 Such photographs may 
negatively influence people concerning the regime. After 
publication of Browne's photograph, journalists were often 
beaten, arrested and had their film exposed before release. The 
U. S. implored the journalists to join the team and show more
110Ibid, p. 325.
m Lunn, unpaginated photograph inserts.
112Fabian, p. 3 27.
113Moeller, p. 363.
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restraint in their reporting.114
The photographers supplying the greatest percentage of 
coverage of the war knew what types of photographs their 
publications would accept. Yet, many photographers still 
submitted subjects that editors found necessary to censor.
Burrows would take photos the magazine reader would just about be 
able to stand, because if the photographs were too horrifying, 
the reader would just turn the page.115 Faas pinned rejected 
photos from AP on his wall in Saigon, photos that were considered 
too shocking to use.116 Television news media censored film they 
feared would prompt evening dinner-hour viewers to switch 
stations.117
The American public did not see the photographic coverage of 
the massacre of My Lai, photographed on March 16, 1968, by 
photographer Ronald Haeberle, until twenty months after the 
incident. American soldiers entered the 700-person village, led 
by Lt. William L. Calley, Jr. As the first two platoons entered 
the hamlet, no one fired upon them or ran away; anyone running 
would have been assumed Vietcong and United States soldiers would 
shoot to kill. Haeberle photographed as soldiers gathered the
114Hammond, pp. 64-65.
115Fabian, p. 327.
116Knightley, p. 4 08.
117Hammond, p . 238.
residents and killed between 90 and 130 men, women and 
children.118 The New York Times report, based on the official 
version supplied to newsmen in Saigon, was published on the front 
page the next day. It stated that "two American Division 
companies had caught a North Vietnamese unit in a pincer 
movement, killing 128 enemy soldiers.1,119 The article stated the 
soldiers were met with heavy artillery barrages and that two 
American soldiers were killed and ten wounded. No mention of 
civilian casualties was made.
Haeberle developed some of his photographs from the My Lai 
to be sent to headquarters for release. He kept the remaining 
black and white and all the color negatives, knowing that none of 
the photos would ever be approved by American editors at that 
time.120
It was not until November 20, 1968, that the photographs 
were presented to Americans in the Cleveland Plain Dealer. "My 
Lai made it clear to America that the moral cost of the war was 
too high."121
The disclosure of the My Lai massacre cleared the way for 
published accounts of previously witnessed American atrocities in 
South Vietnam. U. S. papers were eager to print stories about
118Seymour Hersh, Mv Lai 4: A Report on the Massacre and Its 
Aftermath. (New York: Random House 1970), pp. 47-48.
119Ibid, p. 79.
120Ibid.
121Fabian, pp. 328-329.
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civilian shootings in Vietnam.122 Life bought Haeberle* s color 
photos and ran them with extensive eyewitness accounts of the 
incident.
American soldiers were shown as trigger-happy engineers of 
death in Phillip Jones Griffiths* photographs. His photographs 
depicted that which he witnessed, American GI's killing innocent 
women and children in Vietnam. But Griffiths also pictured GI•s 
as delicate boys and shattered men.123
The Vietnam war was, for the men in combat, a war with **no 
* front*, no * rear * and it is absolutely impossible to tell friend 
from enemy without a program - even with one.**124
**To an increasing extent as the war progressed, being 
involved meant coming to an understanding of what the war was 
doing to the Vietnamese people. ‘All over Vietnam you see the 
faces*, wrote Burrows, ‘more inscrutable and more tired now than 
I have ever known them to be...They are in the middle. The 
pressure on them is terrible and has existed for some 3 0 
years. '1,125
122Hersh, p. 140.
123Fabian, pp. 329-330.
124Moeller ,p. 331.
125Ibid, p. 382.
CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY
It is obvious the media played an important role in the 
Vietnam War. The purpose of this thesis is to determine if there 
was a fundamental change in combat photographic coverage in news 
magazines before and after the Tet offensive in Vietnam during 
the time period of August, 1964, to August, 1973. The Tet 
offensive was chosen as a mid-point since it marked such a 
fundamental turning point in the war. Americans' impression of a 
"clean effective technological war was rudely shaken at Tet in 
1968.nl
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Prior to the Tet offensive, some news personalities had 
already shifted their view to opposition of the war. On February 
27, 1967, CBS anchorman Walter Cronkite reversed his support for 
the war by calling it "a bloody stalemate" and saying, "It is 
increasingly clear to this reporter that the only rational way 
out will be to negotiate, not as victors, but as an honorable 
people..."2
Americans were shown a "new" side of the Vietnam war after 
the Tet offensive. Media coverage shifted from American combat
xEdward Jay Epstein, Between Fact and Fiction: The Problem of 
Journalism (New York: Vintage Books, Oct. 1975) p. 219.
2Ibid, p. 223.
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operations and military equipment to "stories of chaos, confusion 
and near collapse."3 Public opinion polls began reflecting a 
decline in support for the war after Tet.4
The United States government, under the direction of 
President Johnson, sent American troops to assist in the Vietnam 
war to prevent 'Red' domination of Southeast Asia, believing 
South Vietnam was the strategic key. Yet the autocratic policies 
of the South Vietnamese government were unacceptable in 
Washington.5 In essence, the U. S. was engaged in saving South 
Vietnam for the South Vietnamese, yet rejected its present form 
of government.
As for the media, the government had no formal means to 
censor the reportage of foreign nationals without a declaration 
of war. Censorship would have been difficult due to the advent 
of television and satellite technology. In April, 1966, the 
Department of Defense issued guidelines on combat photography. 
After mentioning concern for the next of kin, the notice 
concluded:
"In the war in Vietnam complete reliance has been placed on
news media representatives. There has been no effort to
impose restrictions on movement of audio-visual
3Ibid, p. 226.
4Michael D. Sherer, "Vietnam War Photos and Public Opinion," 
Journalism Quarterly. 66:2:394.
5Susan Moeller, Shooting War (New York: Basic Books, Inc.,
1989), p. 329.
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correspondents in the field or to require in-country 
processing, review and editing of audio-visual material 
produced by accredited correspondents. We hope to preserve 
these freedoms and ask that correspondents cooperate by:
a. Not taking close-up pictures of casualties that 
show faces or anything else that will identify the 
individual.
b. Not interviewing or recording the voices of 
casualties until a medical officer determines that the 
man is physically and mentally able, and the individual 
gives permission."6
The media followed these guidelines at first.
It was not until the Tet offensive of 1968 that the print 
press became thoroughly skeptical in its coverage of the war.7 
News media coverage now began to focus on the Vietnamese 
military, peace negotiations and American withdrawal.8
Noting the shift in support for the war and the appearance 
of a shift in the way the war was being conducted, one might 
assume that a similar shift in the photographic coverage of the 
war also occurred.
Therefore, the fundamental question to be investigated by
6Ibid, p. 365.
7Ibid, p. 352.
8Derrik Mercer, Geoff Mungham and Kevin Williams, The Fog of 
War: The Media on the Battlefield (London: Heinemann, 1987) pp. 
228-231.
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this thesis is: did the image of war, as published in three 
leading news magazines, change following the Tet offensive in 
1968? In order to answer this question, this thesis will seek 
answers to the following sub-questions:
1.) is there a difference in the scenes photographed in 
three leading news magazines before and after the Tet offensive?
2.) is there a difference in the primary subject 
photographed in three leading news magazines before and after the 
Tet offensive?
3.) is there a difference in the way in which the primary 
subject was portrayed in photographs published in three leading 
newsmagazines before and after the Tet offensive?
4.) is there a difference in the perspective presented in 
the photographs published in three leading news magazines before 
and after the Tet offensive?
METHODOLOGY
To answer these questions, photographs from Life. Newsweek, 
and Time that are Vietnam-related will be analyzed. Oscar 
Patterson utilized these three newsmagazines in his Vietnam study 
stating that these sources were "the major national news 
magazines of their type based on subscription, circulation and 
reputation" during the Vietnam war.9 Content analysis is defined
9Oscar Patterson III, "Television's Living Room War in Print: 
Vietnam in News Magazines," Journalism Quarterly. 61:36 (Spring, 
1984) .
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as a "research technique that allows for the objective, 
systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content 
of communication.1,10 Content analysis studies utilize nominal 
scales, that is the assignment of numbers or symbols for the 
purpose of designating subclasses that represent unique 
characteristics. It has been used in several studies to analyze 
news photographs,11 some of which specifically deal with 
photographs of war.12
It should be noted that although these news magazines give a
10Bernard Berelson, Content Analysis in Communication Research 
(New York: The Macmillian Company, 1952).
“Several studies of news photographs have utilized the method 
of content analysis. Roy E. Blackwood, "The Content of News 
Photos: Roles Portrayed by Men and Women," Journalism Quarterly. 
60:710-14 (Winter 1983); James Fosdick, "Picture Content and Source 
in Four Daily Newspapers," Journalism Quarterly. 46:3 68-371 (Summer 
19 69) ; Phillip C. Geraci, "Newspaper Illustration and Readership: 
Is USA Today on Target?" Journalism Quarterly. 61:409-413 (Summer 
1984); Larry Leslie, "Newspaper Photo Coverage of Censure of 
McCarthy," Journalism Quarterly. 63:850-853 (Winter 1983); Susan 
Miller, "The Content of News Photos: Women*s and Men's Roles," 
Journalism Quarterly. 52: 70-75 (Spring 1975); Michael Singletary, 
"Newspaper Photographs: A Content Analysis 1936-1976," Journalism 
Quarterly. 55: 585-589 (Autumn 1978). Glen G. Sparks and Christine 
L. Fehlner, "Faces in the News: Gender Comparisons of Magazine
Photographs", Journal of Communication, pp.70-79 (Autumn 1986); 
Guido H. Stempel III, "Visibility of Blacks in News and News- 
Picture Magazines," Journalism Quarterly. 48:337-339 (Summer 1971) ; 
Kuo-jen Tsang, "News Photos in Time and Newsweek." Journalism 
Quarterly. 61: 578-584 (Autumn 1984).
“Content analysis was utilized in the following studies of war 
photographs: Patterson, pp. 35-39; Sherer, pp.391-395; and Kenrick
S. Thompson and Alfred C. Clarke, "Photographic Imagery and the 
Vietnam War: An Unexamined Perspective," The Journal of Psychology. 
87:279-292 (1975).
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fair representation of the war, they were not the only visual 
news sources offering information concerning the war. Television 
and newspapers were present, as well as other news magazines. 
Therefore, this thesis will be looking for the presence of a 
change in coverage based on the three top news magazines during
the study period and not the entire image of the war being
presented to the public.
Magazine issues will be drawn from the period of August,
1964 to August, 1973. This time period is similar to that 
utilized by Dr. Michael D. Sherer in his study of Vietnam war 
photographs and public opinion. In his study Sherer concluded 
that "as public opinion shifted over time, so too did the image 
of war change."13 His three groups of coded photographs were 
time periods that were similar to those utilized in this thesis:
a) January, 1965 to July, 1967,
b) October, 1967 to December, 1967,
c) February, 1968 to January, 1973.
Sherer's time period was expanded several months to include 
key events that marked President Johnson's decision to officially 
involve American troops in the war and coverage of U. S. bombing 
missions towards the end of U. S. involvement.
In August, 1964, General Westmoreland took over command of 
the rapidly increasing American forces in Vietnam, the first 
land-based jets arrived, and the United States Seventh Fleet was 
patrolling international waters off North Vietnam. During this
13Sherer, pp. 391-395.
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same month, North Vietnamese torpedo boats allegedly attacked 
American destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin. President Johnson's 
decision to retaliate with Navy jets bombing selected naval 
targets in North Vietnam sent the United States into a full-scale 
war. The commitment was made by the U.S. government "to stop 
communist aggression wherever it raises its head."14 Thus the 
beginning date of August, 1964, was set for this thesis.
The ending date, August 1973, was selected because of the 
cessation of United States bombing in Indochina. Even though all 
U. S. ground combat forces were withdrawn from Vietnam by March 
29, 1973, the U. S. bombing in Cambodia did not cease until 
August 15, 1973.15
Stempel has suggested that the analysis of a small, 
carefully selected sample of the relevant content will produce 
results that are just as valid as would analysis of a great deal 
more material.16 For a daily newspaper publication, increasing 
the sample size beyond twelve issues (for a single year) does not 
produce marked differences in the results.17 Jones and Carter 
also found that 12 issues a year compares closely enough with the 
averages of the actual content of the entire universe under study
14Epstein, p. 216.
15Patter son, p . 37.
16Guido Stempel III, "Sample Size in Classifying Subject Matter
in Dailies," Journalism Quarterly. 29:333-334 (1952).
17Ibid, pp. 333-334.
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as to make the sample representative of the entire universe.18
Following these guidelines, a random sample of twelve issues 
per year of Life, Newsweek and Time from August, 1964, to Auqust, 
1973, was analyzed. The author coded all of the images included 
in this study using actual magazine issues whenever possible. 
Microfiche and microfilm copies were used when a newsmagazine was 
not available for a particular date. Following this, intercoder 
reliability was measured by having a second person code a subset
of the same images using the same categories.19
Although only a limited number of studies has been done on
the content of photographs during the Vietnam war, those
utilizing content analysis were reviewed for guidelines and 
categories for this thesis.20 The categories used in studies by
18Robert Jones and Robert Carter, "Some Procedures for 
Estimating 'News Hole' in Content Analysis," Public Opinion 
Quarterly. 37:102-109 (1959).
19Frederick Williams, Reasoning with Statistics. (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston 1986), p. 21.
An acceptable percentage of accuracy between the 
researcher's and the intercoder's results strengthened the 
acceptance of external validity for this study and showed a 
degree of reliability. External validity refers to the 
likelihood another researcher, using the same methods, could 
replicate the results of the study. Validity is "the degree 
to which researchers measure what they claim to measure." 
Reliability refers to "the external and internal consistency 
of measurement." For external reliability, another researcher 
must be able to replicate this study, using the same 
measurements, and reach the same results.
20Patterson, pp. 35-39; Sherer, pp. 391-395; and Thompson, pp. 
279-292.
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Patterson, Sherer, and Thompson and Clark fit the format of this 
study and were therefore adapted for the coding process. The 
categories included:
1) SCENE- The moment captured in the photograph was coded 
as:
a) Actual combat setting, troops under fire, military 
equipment in action.
b) Combat related setting, pre/post combat setting or 
troop movements in combat areas, but not actually in 
combat when the photo was taken.
c) Non-combat setting, out of the field of combat, in 
areas of relative safety such as cities, headquarters, 
etc.
2. SUBJECT- The primary subject of the photograph was coded 
as being:
a) American soldiers which could be accurately 
identified as American.
b) Allied soldiers assisting in the "American" cause, 
most often South Vietnamese.
c) Enemy soldiers whether North Vietnamese or other 
nationality fighting against the American forces.
d) American civilians which could be accurately 
identified as American.
e) Allied civilians assisting in the "American" cause, 
most often South Vietnamese.
f) Enemy civilians whether North Vietnamese or other
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nationality fighting against the American forces.
g) American or Allied weapons/equipment/targets shown 
in Vietnam, whether in battle, transportation or rest.
h) Enemy weapons/equipment/targets shown in Vietnam, 
whether in battle, transportation or rest.
3) PORTRAYAL- The way in which the primary subject was 
portrayed was coded as:
a) Immediate life threatening situation with dead or 
wounded present.
b) Immediate life threatening situation with no dead or 
wounded present.
c) Situation depicting combat related discomfort/ 
fatigue, but no immediate threat to life with dead or 
wounded present.
d) Situation depicting combat related discomfort/ 
fatique, but no immediate threat to life with rio dead 
or wounded present.
e) Situation of relative safety without a sense of 
combat related discomfort/fatigue with dead or wounded 
present.
f) Situation of relative safety without a sense of 
combat related discomfort/fatigue with no dead or 
wounded present.
g) Weapons/equipment/targets shown in a state of
destruction from combat.
h) Weapons/equipment/targets not shown in a state of
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destruction from combat.
4) PERSPECTIVE- The way in which the photograph captured the 
situation was coded as:
a) Close-up, small numbers of people/objects shown in 
tightly cropped views, closer than normal 
conversational perspective.
b) Normal, views with emphasis on full body shots 
and/or equipment viewed in entirety, a normal 
conversational perspective.
c) Distant, views where backgrounds are highly visible 
and people/objects occupy relatively small parts of the 
entire image.
Only photographs taken within Vietnam were coded.
Photographs such as formal portraits of military leaders, 
diplomats, file photos of people, equipment or facilities unless 
taken in the content of conflict, were omitted.
The photographs, once coded, were placed into one of 
following two categories:
a) Photos published prior to the Tet offensive, August, 
1964, to January 25, 1968.
b) Photos published during and after Tet January 26, 1968, 
to August 15, 1973.
Following this process, a series of cross tabulations were 
run to determine if the images published in the news magazines
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changed after the Tet offensive occurred.21
The nominal data collected for this content analysis met all 
three assumptions concerning cross tabulations.22 Inferences
21Williams, p. 110.
Cross tabulation is used to focus on the frequency of 
observations in each individual cell of a matrix. It is the 
primary test of statistical inference used in cross­
classification analysis. Differences in table distributions 
will be noted in this thesis. A measure of association is 
shown by an acceptable significance level of Chi-Square. Chi- 
Square is designed to assess the degree to which a cross­
classification matrix deviates from the assumptions of 
independence. Significance level refers to what you actually 
arrive after testing. The probability level is that which you 
set up before doing the test.
22John Bowers and John Courtright, Communication Research 
Methods. (Glenville, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1984) 
p. 282.
Inferential statistics use statistics to test some 
theoretical hypothesis or prediction. These assumptions 
include:
1.) "The categories making up the individual nominal level 
variables must be mutually exclusive and exhaustive." Each 
observation, therefore, must fit into only one category and 
the categories must cover all relevant classes of the 
variable.
2.) Secondly, "the observations must be independently 
sampled. This requires that the category to which one 
observation is assigned should in no way be affected by the 
classification of any other observation."
3.) The final assumption deals with the expected frequencies 
for each cell: "What is the minimum size of the expected
frequencies for each cell?" To avoid inaccurate statistical 
inferences concerning this assumption, the following minimum 
expected frequencies for each cell should be considered. "For 
matrices which contain more than a single degree-of-freedom, 
the minimum expected frequency in each cell for a valid Chi- 
Square test is 5. For matrices with 1 degree of freedom 
(i.e., 2 x 2 matrices), a minimum expected frequency in each 
cell of 10 is generally considered acceptable."
The Chi-Square values obtained for this thesis were 
compared to the appropriate critical value, depending on the 
degrees of freedom for each test. Critical value refers to
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about the ChiSquare statistic were therefore accepted as valid.
the predetermined value. For the tests in this thesis which 
surpassed the critical value, the null hypothesis was rejected 
and the relationship was generalized to the population, 
therefore accepted as valid.
See also Appendix E, page 352 for the "Critical Values 
for the Chi-Square Statistic" Table.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The Vietnam war stretched through an entire decade of 
American history. The print media kept the American public up- 
to-date with photographs and written reports. Photographs were 
used by newsmagazines to visually present the war since the 
general public could not witness it first hand. Yet, the image 
of war presented differed before and after the Tet offensive in 
January, 1968, in the three newsmagazines reviewed in this study.
Newsmagazine photographs of the war in Vietnam published 
from August, 1964 to August, 1973, were evaluated for their 
primary subject, scene, portrayal of the subject and the 
perspective of the photograph by the author. Intercoder 
reliability was measured by having a second person code a subset 
of the same images using the same categories. The intercoder 
test results for the four categories were as follows: Scene, .91; 
Subject .93; Portrayal, .87; and Perspective, .81. Finally, 
images published before and after the Tet Offensive were tested 
for shifts in coverage using cross tabulation analysis. The 
acceptable probability level was p<.05 for each test. This 
analysis revealed three distinct shifts in the photographic 
portrayal of the war.
One shift in photographic coverage was in the scenes 
captured in the Vietnam images (Table 1). Prior to the Tet 
offensive, the American public was plunged right into the
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battlefield with the soldiers. Scenes of actual combat were 
readily available for the public to view. For example, Larry 
Burrows1 photo essay of helicopter crew Yankee Papa 13 was shot 
in April, 1965, under heavy enemy gunfire. While the crew of 
helicopter Papa 13 struggled to rescue the crew of disabled 
Yankee Papa 3, Burrows photographed Papa 3's co-pilot dying on 
the helicopter floor.1 Twenty-five of Burrows' photographs were 
used to tell this story, the first series of photographs since 
Robert Capa's last pictures from Leipzig in World War II where a 
man was shown in the moments immediately before and after his 
death.2
Following Tet, a definite shift away from actual combat 
images and toward more combat related scenes (settings depicting 
pre/post combat or troop movements in combat areas, but not 
actually in combat when the photograph was taken) and non-combat 
related photographs (out of the field of combat, in areas of 
safety such as cities, headquarters, etc.) was apparent. The 
public was not taken into the battlefield as often after Tet. A 
greater percentage of photographs of scenes taken during non­
violent periods of the war or completely away from the actual 
battles were published after the Tet offensive. These non-combat 
photographs included images depicting soldier camaraderie and
1Life, 58:15:32, (April 16, 1965).
2Susan Moeller, Shooting War. (New York:Basic Books,Inc., 
1989), pp. 393-394.
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political figures visiting Vietnam.3
TABLE 1
Primary Scene in the Photograph 
bv Percent
Combat
Combat Related Non Combat
Pre Tet 26.23 34.43 39.34
Post Tet 16.40 39.12 44.48
x2=9.663, df=2, p<0.008
The subject matter of the photographs also changed during 
the war (Table 2). Prior to the Tet Offensive, more emphasis was 
placed on the American soldier fighting the war. The public was 
able to view American soldiers in action, such as during the 
battle near Hill 484. Life published a series of photographs on 
this battle including Burrows' images of the death of a company's 
point man who had run to the top of the hill and "was shot 
dead."4 Four marines were pictured carrying the point man by his 
arms and legs to an evacuation helicopter.
The three newsmagazines also showed the public who our 
soldiers were assisting, the South Vietnamese Civilians. These
3Newsweek, 77:9:18, (March 1, 1971).
4Life, 61:18:37, (October 28, 1966).
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photographs quite often depicted women and children being 
evacuated from their home after being bombed. Photographer Paul 
Schutzer photographed a mother clutching her blood-drenched child 
moments after jets strafed before landing.5 Several pictures 
depicted children playing in building rubble left from bombing 
raids.
These two subjects, American soldiers and Vietnam civilians, 
were pictured quite often prior to Tet. After the Tet Offensive, 
American soldiers did not receive as much attention and allied 
civilians received only a slight increase in coverage. After 
Tet, photographic coverage shifted from depicting the American 
soldier fighting the war to the allied soldier which 
jumped 100 percent. This increase, though, accounted for only a 
small portion of the total number of pictures published.
Overall, as the coverage of the American soldier declined after 
Tet, a parallel increase in allied soldier coverage occurred.6 
These results are consistent with previous research.7
5Life, 59:22:54, (November 26, 1965).
6Newsweek, 77:2:18, (March 1, 1971).
7This thesis reviewed the subject of Vietnam photography based 
on a pre/post Tet breakdown over the duration of the war. A 
similar study was conducted by Dr. Michael Sherer* Yet, Shererfs 
focus was on American public opinion and Vietnam photographic 
coverage. He reviewed images based on two-week periods of time 
when public opinion on the war was being measured. Sherer utilized 
the same three newsmagazines as in this thesis. He concluded that 
after public opinion shifted to opposition to the war, between 
December, 1967 and February, 1968, ffthe three news magazines 
carried a far greater percentage of images of allied forces and
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TABLE 2
Primary Subject in the Image 
bv Percent
American Allied Enemy American Allied Enemy Amer. Enemy
Soldier Soldier Soldier Civilian Civilian Civilian *WET *WET
Pre Tet 
N=366
38.25 7.92 5.74 4.92 18.85 5.74 13.66 4.92
Post Tet 
N=317
28.39 14.83 6. 62 3.47 21.45 5.36 11.36 8.52
x2=17.907, df=7, p<0.012
*WET= Weapons, Equipment and Targets
Finally, a shift in the portrayal of the primary subject was 
apparent in the three newsmagazines (Table 3). After Tet, the 
public was shown a much more sanitized version of the war. The 
focus shifted away from life threatening situations to scenes 
portraying situations that did not include such harsh reminders 
of the suffering that war involves. Photographs often depicted 
scenes of relative safety or, at most, scenes of discomfort or 
fatigue. Fewer dead or wounded individuals were pictured, no 
matter what degree of danger was apparent. Photographs of 
soldiers wearing peace symbols on their helmets and uniforms 
began replacing images of death and destruction.8 The public was 
shielded from the true destruction of the war as photographic
with less visual emphasis on American forces and equipment."
Michael D. Sherer, "Vietnam War Photos and Public Opinion,"
Journalism Quarterly, 66:394 (Summer, 1989).
Newsweek. 77:2:29, (January 11, 1971).
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images portrayed a sense of safety to Americans who were so far 
away from the actual fighting.
TABLE 3
Portrayal of the Primary Subject 
bv Percent
Threat Threat Fatigue Fatigue Relative Relative *WET *WET
To Life To Life Discomf. Discomf. Safety Safety Des- Not Des-
w/ dead no dead w/ dead no dead w/ dead no dead troved troved
Pre Tet 
N=3 66
10.11 12.30 11.75 12.02 2.19 33.61 11.20 6.83
Post Tet 
N=317
5.05 7.26 10.41 17.03 0. 63 42.27 8.83 8.52
x2=20.964, df=7, p<0.004
*WET= Weapons, Equipment and Targets
No statistically significant difference emerged in the last 
category of perspective. Perspective refers to the way the 
photographs captured the situation, either as a close-up shot, a 
normal, conversational shot or a distant, more inclusive shot. 
Photographers used relatively the same perspective before and 
after the Tet offensive.
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TABLE 4
Perspective of the Primary Subject 
bv Percent
Close-Up Normal Distant
Pre Tet 26.23 50.27 23.50
Post Tet 25.55 51.10 23.34
x2=0.055, df=2, p<0.973
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSIONS
After review of the Vietnam war photographs published in the 
three news magazines from August, 1964 to August 1973, it is 
evident that the image of war did shift after the Tet offensive.
Three noticeable shifts occurred in the images of the 
Vietnam war. Prior to Tet, only a 13 percent variance in the 
number of photographs depicting combat and non-combat related 
scenes was evident. Following Tet, a 28 percent variance was 
apparent. The American soldier received, by far, the most 
coverage by the newsmagazines. Finally, more photographs 
portraying life threatening situations with dead or wounded 
individuals included in the picture were published before the Tet 
offensive.
Following the Tet Offensive, stronger focus was placed on 
the allied soldier and civilian. Less emphasis was placed on 
life threatening images after Tet as the focus shifted towards 
scenes of relative safety. The American public was also shown 
more photographs of the weapons, equipment and targets being used 
in the war following Tet. Yet, these images were shown less 
often in actual combat and simply in maneuvers.1
If it is true that a picture is worth a thousand words, that 
the photograph can explain in more detail than written prose the 
events of the world, then the American public was given a
1Time, 94:23:23, (December 5, 1969).
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sheltered view of the reality of the Vietnam war following the 
Tet offensive. Americans were shielded from viewing the 
destructive forces of bombs exploding on both the land and the 
people. Rarely did the public see a dead or wounded individual 
after Tet,
Why did such shifts in photographic coverage occur? It is 
this author's opinion that the newsmagazines felt a need to 
publish the most important events of the day in the limited space 
they had available. After Tet, space for Vietnam war coverage 
had to include peace negotiations and the gradual withdrawal of 
American soldiers.
Several questions requiring further research are prompted by 
the results of this thesis. First, why did coverage of combat 
photographs, often depicting dead or wounded, decrease after the 
Tet Offensive? Secondly, did the shifts in photographic coverage 
directly effect the war in some way? Finally, why were such 
photographs as Ronald Haeberle's scenes of the My Lai massacre 
originally censored by U.S. print publications and then released 
years later? Further research is necessary to answer these 
questions.
